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The international development community is increasingly focused on ensuring that 
financial and human resources are used to achieve intended results. Development 
practitioners have long strived to improve performance in developing nations, e.g., in 
GDP per capita, literacy rates, nutrition levels, and many other aspects of country 
performance. However, in recent years many developing countries are choosing to 
follow patterns that have emerged in businesses and in some developed country 
governments over the last several decades of establishing results-oriented monitoring 
frameworks that report on progress against strategic plans, budgets and sector 
strategies (Drucker, 1954: 119-26; ADB 1999, 334). This results orientation builds on 
participatory approaches to strengthen and take advantage of citizen and other 
stakeholder perspectives on how to improve public services. Under a results-oriented 
approach initiatives are taken to track a manageable set of indicators, and to provide 
accurate, timely and transparent information on which to base comprehensive reports to 
all stakeholders. Development partners are reinforcing these trends in various ways, 
including a global effort to achieve "Millennium Development Goals" by 2015, and 
efforts to harmonize the work of aid agencies to reduce the burden of aid administration 
on developing country governments (OECD 2005a). This paper addresses five key 
elements of this new orientation: (i) clarifying the language of performance, (ii) defining 
indicative performance indicators, (iii) exploring tools for performance measurement, (iv) 
making changes to improve performance, and (v) creating the performance and 
knowledge culture in organizations. It then gives examples of these elements from Asia. 
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Performance, results, outputs, outcomes, and impacts 
 
Performance in public agencies in Asia and elsewhere is the consequence of response 
to public actions that express demand for goods and services, and may be defined in 
terms of both results and effort. Most recent attention has been on the former, and the 
sequence of events leading to results. This process may be viewed in the form of a 
production function model: inputs, work planning and activity leads to outputs and 
ultimately outcomes or I+WPA->OP->OC. This sequence starts with expression of 
stakeholder demands for a service or a set of results. Governments respond by 
allocating resource inputs to meet demands, and these resources are then used so as 
to contribute to production of results that may be measured as outputs and outcomes. A 
set of processes or activities are employed to acquire and transform inputs into results 
including, inter alia, strategic planning, policy and program decision making and 
implementation through workload definition, budget formulation and execution, 
procurement, performance monitoring and, finally, accounting, auditing, and policy and 
program evaluation (Moynihan and Ingraham 2003, 469-490). The production function 
model implies some degree of efficiency in transforming inputs to results. However, in 
practice, various public sector rules, regulations and processes instituted for diverse 
reasons including control, accountability, transparency, affirmative action, regional 
balance and, not the least, the politics of compromise among elected leaders, often 
work against achievement of efficiency and effectiveness in transforming inputs into 
results (Jones and Thompson 1999). 
 
After inputs and workload, outputs are the most identifiable link in the results production 
chain: the physical goods, services, institutional and/or behavioral changes that are 
created by work using various inputs. Outcomes follow from production of outputs. 
Outcomes are, ideally, the correct responses to public service demands, i.e., purposes 
achieved. Outcomes typically are achieved over a longer period of time than outputs 
and are thus more difficult to measure with any degree of confidence in the short term. 
Outcomes may be positive, neutral or negative (benefits - costs = net benefits or 
outcomes). Further, the impact of multiple outcomes goes beyond that of any single 
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outcome, i.e., higher-level results to which multiple outcomes contribute. Outcomes may 
be quite different from what was intended. And even if the intended outcome is 
achieved, there may be unanticipated factors that affect eventual results. For example, 
in the United States, the federal government response to Hurricane Katrina and the 
resultant disaster for the city of New Orleans succeeded in achieving its intended output 
of assistance to residents of the city and region. However, the length of time that it took 
for the government to respond created all kinds of negative and unanticipated 
consequences. The eventual results of federal government assistance to New Orleans 
and the area affected by the hurricane remain uncertain in terms of net benefit. If the 
intended initial result was lives saved through rapid evacuation, provision of immediate 
medical aid and maintenance of social stability in the crisis aftermath, then the actual 
result was not what was expected by residents of the area and the American public.  
 
An alternative and more traditional way to assess performance is based on level of 
effort (workload). Measuring effort often is much easier than measuring outputs and 
outcomes. Measuring and recognizing effort often is important for morale. Still, there are 
many reasons why hard work, even if it can be measured accurately, may not translate 
into expected results, including the difficulty of tasks and multiple agent coordination, 
and the influence of unexpected and uncontrollable external events. In addition, hard-
working individuals and teams may find that even though they followed rules, 
regulations and procedures in using inputs and delivering outputs in the proper manner, 
the resulting outputs and outcomes are less than desired. To address such problems, 
many public managers in recent years have found innovative ways to deliver expected 
outputs, in hope that desired outcomes will be achieved. Such public managers view 
their agencies as adaptive systems that respond to demands of citizens and other 
stakeholders and to contingency in the environment. And increasingly, under new 
institutional governance arrangements including outsourcing and privatization, 
managers may tend to view their agencies as involved in competition with other service 
providers to deliver the best value for money to their citizen/customers. Under such 
circumstances, they tend to think like businessmen about strategic positioning of their 
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product and service lines in conformance with consumer preferences and market 




Since it is often the case in public organizations in Asia and elsewhere that, "What gets 
measured, gets done,” (Peters 1986), it is important to selectively measure events in the 
results chain. Input/workload/output indicators include measurement of work performed 
and productivity ratios, time targets, utilization rates and unit-cost indicators. Workload 
and productivity ratios measure the quantity of work performed, such as number of 
cases handled, number of patients treated, number of students taught, number of new 
recruits signed up per week, or number of driving licenses processed per day. Time 
targets measure the time expended for completion of a given task such as processing 
an income tax return, or uploading completed census questionnaires into a computer, 
i.e., cycle time. Utilization rates measure the extent to which a service is used, such as 
number of visitors at a national park, or number of officials completing a training course. 
Unit-cost measurement ties performance measures to resources consumed in 
production, i.e., the average or marginal cost of delivering a defined unit of service, such 
as the cost of providing schooling for a 3rd grader for one day or one school year or the 
cost of performing a specific type of medical procedure. Unit cost measurement requires 
both careful specification of units of service and direct and indirect costs of service 
production. 
 
Performance indicators should meet five criteria. They should be: 
 
• Clear—i.e., precise and unambiguous (not necessarily quantitative); 
• Relevant—i.e., appropriate to the objective at hand (and not used simply 
because they are readily available); 
• Economic—the data required should be available at reasonable cost; 
• Adequate—by themselves or in combination with others, the measures must 
provide a sufficient basis for the assessment of performance; 
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• Monitorable—in addition to clarity and availability of information, the indicators 
must be amenable to independent scrutiny (ADB 1999, 334).  
 
If an indicator does not meet all five criteria, it should not be used. For example, the 
input/output indicators noted above are best for measuring standard services such as 
clerical tasks, and routine teaching and health care. They may not be adequate for 
measuring complex education and health services, econometric, political or legal work. 
As one moves up the results chain from inputs through to outcome and impact, it 
becomes even more difficult to find indicators that meet all the criteria. For example, 
public perception surveys are often used to measure process, outcome and impact of 
public services. Such surveys, although useful for anecdotal evidence, are fraught with 
methodological problems. Corruption perception surveys, for example, may reveal an 
increase in perceived corruption when anti-corruption agencies become more active 
and their work is reported in the media, even though the more effective policing may 
actually be reducing corruption.  
 
Performance Measurement 
Once appropriate indicators are selected, performance measures may be determined 
based on suitable criteria. Criteria must be adapted to the cultural context of each nation 
in Asia because cultural differences are so pronounced between the various nations 
and governments in the area. Targets may be set based on applicable standards or 
benchmarks. Thus, a health care agency may benchmark itself against counterparts in 
other parts of the country, or in other countries. Agencies responsible for road 
maintenance may use a standardized tool for budget and work planning to ensure that 
timely maintenance is carried out. Although public agencies often find they lack data to 
enable accurate measurement of performance, realization that this contributes to the 
drive to improve data element definition and collection so as to enable eventual 
measurement. 
 
For aid dependent countries, standards or benchmarks may be suggested by donor 
agencies. For example, the World Bank and ADB use a common set of 16 economic 
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and governance indicators and a much larger number of sub-indicators for monitoring 
annual performance to determine eligibility for concessional financing.  Each sub-
indicator is graded on a scale of 1 to 6 by donor agency staff, in consultation with 
partner governments. Scores are made public each year to encourage transparency, 
and civic pressure on governments to improve their ratings. 
 
Such standards also may be set by intergovernmental bodies such as the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF no date), which combats money laundering and terrorist 
financing. The FATF monitors country implementation of necessary measures, reviews 
money laundering and terrorist financing techniques and counter-measures, and 
promotes the adoption and implementation of appropriate measures globally. Countries 
judged not to measure up to basic standards can be severely sanctioned. 
 
Changes to improve performance 
 
Once performance can be measured and performance shortfalls are identified, many 
actions may be taken to address shortfalls. Two broad types of actions are suggested 
here: strengthening individual performance appraisal and incentives, and adopting one 
or more other types of organizational changes, as noted.  
 
To determine the proper mix of each type of action, capacity assessments are often 
required, particularly in the Asian context due to chronic government personnel capacity 
weakness in many nations in the region (Wescott 2004, 78-102).  Competitive pay and 
incentives are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for building capacity to effectively 
perform critical tasks. Improving the performance of a task needs to begin with mapping 
the organizations involved in performing it (Hilderbrand and Grindle 1995, 441-464). 
The organizational map is the picture of the task network: the organizations with primary 
responsibility for carrying out the task, those that are less central but still play a role, 
and those that provide various kinds of support to the performance of the task. The 
description of interactions between these organizations is important, as is analysis of 
whether the interactions among the institutions are effective or are an area of capacity 
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weakness. Questions of relationships and coordination among organizations are 
important here. All the dimensions of capacity need to be viewed from the perspective 
of the performance of the task. 
 
The second step involves looking outward from the task network. What contextual 
factors play a significant role regarding the capacity to perform these tasks, and how do 
they affect how -- and how well -- the tasks are performed? At the level just above the 
task network, the impact of the institutions of the public sector needs to be considered, 
along with variables in the broader economic, political and social environment.  
 
The third step focuses on each organization and its human resources. These are 
closely interwoven, with the human resources a principal component of organizational 
capacity, but only as brought together, structured, and utilized by the organization. A 
profile of the human resource dimension should focus on the recruitment, training, 
education and retention of skilled managerial, professionals and technical personnel. 
Questions to be addressed about performance include: what impact does the 
organization’s human resource profile have on its ability to perform its assigned tasks 
and reach its goals? What are the organization’s human resource strengths and 
weaknesses? Whereas the human resource profile of an organization is very important, 
whether those skilled personnel are effectively utilized is frequently the key to an 
organization’s level of capacity to perform its assigned tasks and reach its goals. This 
focuses analysis on the organizational level, where such factors as the structure of work 
and authority relations, appraisal and incentive systems, formal and informal behavioral 
norms, management practices, and leadership influence whether skilled personnel are 
able and willing to contribute fully to performing tasks (O'Donnell 2000).  
 
In addition, there are a number of other human resource related capacity issues. Does 
the organization possess and allocate adequate financial and physical resources to 
function effectively? Is it organized to use resources effectively and efficiently to reach 
its goals? Is it able to interact with other organizations, clients, and other stakeholders in 
networking and problem solving? Capacity strengthening is most effective when it is 
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designed based on a thorough assessment relative to the issues noted above (Klitgaard 
and Light 2005, 23, 39, 309; Behn 2004).  
 
Evaluations of ADB and other donor agency support to capacity strengthening in Asia 
show that such assessments are often not carried out, and thus the assistance is less 
effective that desired (ADB 1997, 8-10). To address these concerns, ADB contributed to 
an extensive capacity assessment in 2003 of elected commune councils in Cambodia, 
and key organizations they work with at national, provincial and commune levels prior to 
making investments in capacity building. Elected commune councils have relatively little 
decision making power, and are subject to bureaucratic control from their governor, and 
from central ministries. Although citizen participation is minimal in commune affairs, 
survey results suggest that citizens have a favorable impression of their performance. 
Since commune council members are mainly elderly, conservative men with relatively 
low levels of education, most have limited capacity for absorbing training. However, 
commune clerks need enhanced skills to deal with complex programming requirements 
(ADB 2003, 57-60). Training also is needed to support civil registration of 95% of 
Cambodia’s citizens not presently registered. This exercise requires close coordination 
with commune council chiefs, provincial and district staff, and the Office of Civil 
Registration and Department of Local Administration (DOLA) of the Ministry of Interior. 
A separate assessment for DOLA outlined the following priority steps for building 
capacity: competitive staff incentives, clear strategic direction, new organizational 
structure aligned with this, and a professional human resource function. Without these 
initiatives, any training provided will mainly contribute to the personal development of 
staff, not to the achievement of organizational goals (ADB 2004a, 6-7).  
 
One element of capacity strengthening in Asia deserves special mention. For reforms to 
take hold, there need to be change agents strategically located in key functional areas 
to spread new ways of working throughout the public administration system. This is 
critical in Asia where national political decision makers -- often a single chief executive 
(e.g., a national government President, a treasury minister or civil service minister), 
have such pervasive influence over organizations, government and governance. These 
 9 
agents need to be carefully selected, positioned at an appropriate level, and provided 
with good working facilities, flexible procedures and other incentives. They need to be 
good at teaching others on-the-job, and at networking across organizations. Such 
agents of change and their organizational units are different from the project 
implementation offices typically set up by donor agencies. The latter are intended to be 
insulated from mainstream administrative systems on the assumption that this is the 
best way to prevent corruption and ensure effective delivery of donor support. In 
contrast, agents of change emerge within existing structures and work to change them 
from within, then spreading innovations across government. 
For example, the Hyderabad (India) Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board uses 
its Single Window Cell (SWC) to reduce corruption for new connections. Previously, 
applications were made to one of 120 section offices, and then forwarded to 14 other 
staff before approval, each requiring "speed payments." Under the SWC, the application 
process is centralized in one, public place, with applications recorded on computers that 
are difficult for corrupt officials to alter. Staffs become motivated to provide good service 
with distinctive uniforms, modern offices and individual computer terminals. Their 
service improvement has been praised extensively in the media, which further improves 
staff motivation (Davis 2004, 62-63). 
 
Another element of strengthen performance in Asia and elsewhere has to do with 
appropriate monitoring and control system design and use of controls that are 
compatible with performance management goals. The dilemma in the use of 
management control in public organizations boils down to a matter of emphasis. The 
emphasis of control systems can be on management control or on management control, 
the former used to establish a control framework and enforce its rules while the primary 
use of the latter is to motivate employees to work more productively. 
 
Due to this distinction, the design and operation of control systems can profoundly 
influence governmental performance.  Legal strictures and sanctions exist to prevent 
fraud, waste and misuse of funds, but they are not enough. By their very nature, they 
emphasize what not to do, not what to do. Without appropriate performance standards, 
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managers cannot be held accountable for performance.  Consequently, central agency 
control systems are not designed to optimize the quality, quantity, and price of goods and 
services purchased with public money, but to enforce accountability oriented rules 
(Anthony and Young 1984, 21). 
 
The choice of whom to subject to controls and when to execute controls is not as easy.  
The control system designer has a number of options given the possibilities for combining 
the following variables.  First, the subject may be either an organization or an individual. 
Second, controls may be executed before or after the subject acts.  The former may be 
identified as ex ante and the latter as ex post controls (Demski and Feltham, 1976). Ex 
ante controls are intended to prevent subjects from doing wrong things or to compel them 
to behave legally. Necessarily, they take the form of authoritative commands or rules that 
specify what the subject must do, may do, and must not do.  Subjects are held responsible 
for complying with these commands, and the controller attempts to monitor and enforce 
compliance. In contrast, ex post controls are executed after the subject decides on and 
carries out a course of action and after some of the consequences of the subject's 
decisions are known.  Since bad decisions cannot be undone after they are carried out, ex 
post controls are intended to motivate subjects to make good decisions.  Subjects are held 
responsible for the consequences of decisions, and the controller attempts to monitor 
consequences and rewards or sanctions accordingly.  
 
This synopsis of control system design and use is intended to indicate that ex post controls 
designed to motivate good performance are superior instruments in terms of compatibility 
with performance management.  This is not intended to imply that ex ante controls will 
cease to be employed. To the contrary, rules to prevent illegal behavior are absolutely 
necessary and must be sustained and used diligently. However, when it comes to the 
selection of control methodology as part of a performance management system, much 
greater emphasis is needed in progressive public organizations on ex post controls 
accompanied by economic and other types of evaluation after the fact to define how 
management performance can best be improved. The emphasis of use of the ex post 
approach is to guide, coach and steer rather than to exercise direct control, per se. To 
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reiterate, the purpose of management control systems should be to motivate good 
performance through the use of incentives rather than punitive sanctions (Thompson and 
Jones 1986). 
 
Ingraham, Selden and Moynihan provide additional perspective on individual and 
organizational performance incentives (Ingraham, Selden and Moynihan 2000, 54-60). 
They explain that building human capital should be regarded as an investment and not 
simply as a cost to the organization to sustain productivity. “Members of the public 
service are…government’s most important resource. Failure to understand and value 
that resource will inevitably be linked to lack of capacity and performance" (Ingraham, 
Selden and Moynihan 2005, 58). They also point out the difference between providing 
rule-based versus goal or performance based managerial flexibility. As Kettl et. al. 
discovered, the former does not contribute to increased value creation while the later is 
more likely to produce the alleged benefits of “letting managers manage” (Kettl, 
Ingraham, Sanders and Horner 1996, 25). Ingraham et. al. also cite the importance of 
leadership commitment, “Leaders are part of the organization’s culture, its reward 
structure, and as such define the clarity of goals and objectives. If leaders abdicate this 
responsibility, the performance effort is moot.” They emphasize that both leaders and 
managers, “…should be rewarded for high employee and organizational 
performance…" (Ingraham, Selden and Moynihan, 2000: 59). They also point out the 
importance of organizational partnering and networking out of recognition that few, if 
any, complex socio-economic problems can be solved unilaterally by government 
agencies, NGOs or other entities. Finally, they note that, “Performance is the 
driver…Performance rewards and incentives must actually contribute to performance"  
(Ingraham, Selden and Moynihan 2000, 58).  
 
Some public sector organizations have tried to boost performance by allocating financial 
bonuses to their best performing staff, as is the case in many private businesses. 
However, there is little evidence that such bonuses in the public sector help to improve 
performance for many reasons. First, because public sector jobs are diverse and 
multidimensional, it is almost impossible to compare the accomplishments of staff to 
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one another by a common metric.  Second, in the public sector tasks tend to be 
performed by teams and not by an individual. The award of bonus to one individual 
within a team is likely to occasion considerable resentment amongst other team 
members. Third, public sector employees are importantly motivated by the values of 
their organization as well as by their financial compensation. For public officials focused 
on financial gain, a significant portion may come after they leave public sector 
employment, and parlay their expertise and contacts for the benefit of the private sector. 
Bonuses received during public sector employment are typically too small to motivate 
performance, and risk causing damage to teamwork and the feeling of making a 
valuable public service contribution. The financial incentives that tend to work best 
during public sector employment are associated with merit-based promotions. Bonuses 
may also be effective when they are offered to staff doing a very similar job, such as 
Navy recruiters (Asch 1990). 
 
Increased information technology support is another of the many changes needed to 
improve performance and employee productivity. Other elements of change to enhance 
productivity may include altering the nature of markets within which organizations 
operate. Alternative institutional arrangements for the provision of services may lead to 
productivity enhancement -- including devolution of authority and responsibility to sub-
national jurisdictions, outsourcing to the private and not-for-profit sectors, and 
privatization of service delivery. Cohen and Peterson point out the need for a 
broadening of institutions producing and providing needed goods and services to the 
public at more efficient costs, wherever they are located and whether they are public, 
quasi-public or private (Cohen and Peterson 1999, 61). The use of differential pricing 
systems under such arrangements may increase productivity by rationing services more 
equitably. Enhancing market competition in provision of services to the public may result 
in a plurality of agencies, public and private, operating at different scales of jurisdiction, 
providing potentially duplicative services. This circumstance gives rise to debate about 
the consequences of such overlap in terms of economic efficiency, the longer term 
consequences of increased public agency and market competition, problems of clarity 
of accountability where mandates are devolved to create overlap of roles and 
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responsibilities, and the fiscal effects on subordinate governments of multiple source 
service provision.  
 
Relationships between markets and creating the performance and knowledge 
culture in organizations 
 
Key to longer term improvement of performance in public organizations is creation of a 
knowledge culture that encourages self-assessment and learning, quick analysis and 
innovation, and knowledge creation investment in human resources and technology 
(Jones and Thompson 1999). As Zuboff explained, efficient operations in the modern 
workplace call for a more equal distribution of knowledge, authority, and responsibility -- 
to create value from information, members of the organization must be given the 
opportunity to know more and do more, i.e., "...dismantling the very same managerial 
hierarchy that once brought greatness." (Zuboff 1988, 204) From this viewpoint, both 
the rise of government and bureaucracy in what were developing nations the first half of 
the 20th century and their decline in the second half can be explained as rational 
responses to changing circumstances, which have created new opportunities as well as 
threats.  
 
In countries that were developing in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries, 
progressive leadership backed by a populist following created a professional 
bureaucracy to manage the public functions of the early 20th century city. Streets had to 
be paved, harbors deepened, electric lighting systems, street railways, sewage disposal 
plants, water supplies, and fire departments had to be installed or drastically improved. 
And, in fact, developing nations face similar challenges presently. As Rauch has pointed 
out, establishing a professional bureaucracy at the municipal level in what are now 
developed nations led directly to higher levels of investment in infrastructure and 
significant increases in economic growth (Rauch 1995).  Clearly, in the first half of the 
20th century in what are now developed nations, direct government provision and 
regulation worked fairly well when compared to the alternatives -- private monopoly, 
contracting out, etc. Indeed, in this era 'postalization' (e.g., state provision of 
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communications, transportation, and power infrastructure) played about the same role 
as 'privatization' does today -- and for much the same reasons.  
 
In the contemporary international community where the public sector is being 
transformed by the information revolution and advances in information technology, the 
linkage between network effects and good practice in knowledge organizations (Nonaka 
and Nishiguchi, 2001; Nissen, 2005) must be noted. In such organizations increasingly 
there is more value added through delegated actions of knowledge workers with support 
from knowledge networks than through traditional hierarchical command and control 
bureaucratic procedures and practices. New transnational approaches resulting from 
increased mobility and interconnectivity among knowledge workers in both the public 
and private sectors are pragmatic adaptations to new economic and technological 
realities (Economist, 2006: 1-16). Although in the past few years researchers have 
attempted to conceptualize these practices under the rubric of “transnationalism” (see 
for example, Ammassari and Black, 2001; Meyer, 2001; Vertovec, 2002) and some 
have proposed the notion of a “scientific diaspora” (Meyer and Brown, 1999) and “brain 
circulation” (Saxenian, 2002), detailed analyses of these initiatives are limited (although 
see Nonaka and Nishiguchi, 2001). The spillover effects of the knowledge economy 
have created new organizational forms superior for problem solving under the new 
international economic order that thrives on networking rather than standard operating 
procedures and enforcement of bureaucratic rules and thinking (Economist, 2006: 1-
16). In turn, this has had a direct impact on the knowledge exchange element of 
diasporas (Wescott, 2006), with potential value added for public and private 
organizations. 
 
In 21st century, it is evident that developing nations face the need to establish and 
promote effective civil service systems and investment in human capital capacity to 
benefit from developments related to the emergence of the knowledge industry and 
economy. However, the corollary question that arises is whether this movement should 
be accompanied by creation of large, centralized bureaucratic organizations as a means 
of guiding development, or does the better path lie with devolution of authority and 
 15 
responsibility to local jurisdictions similar to those that were successful in building 
infrastructure in nations in the past? 
 
In terms of comparing the circumstance of developing nations in the 21st century to the 
experience of now developed nations in earlier times, it appears that a variety of 
lessons may be learned. Administrative efficiency once implied the Weberian 
bureaucratic paradigm (Barzelay and Armajani 1992).  Large bureaucracies were 
justified by economies of scale and scope. Scale economies are produced by spreading 
fixed expenses, especially investments in plant and equipment and the organization of 
production lines, over larger volumes of output, thereby reducing unit costs. Scope 
economies are produced by exploiting the division of labor -- sequentially combining 
highly specialized functional units in multifarious ways to produce a variety of products. 
In turn, large bureaucracies were made possible in the 19th and first half of the 20th 
century by innovations in organizational design and administrative control. It may be 
argued that the driving forces behind the modern managerialist movement today are 
similar to those that produced the bureaucratic revolution of the early 20th century.   
 
Reschenthaler and Thompson (1996) explained that reductions in information costs 
have produced four major shifts in the comparative advantage of alternative institutional 
arrangements. These are: 
 
1. The efficacy of the market has increased relative to government provision and 
control, which has had the effect of increasing the payoffs to free markets, secure 
property rights, and minimal government intervention; 
2. The efficacy of the market and other self-organizing systems has increased relative to 
hierarchically coordinated systems, which has had the effect of decreasing the payoff to 
hierarchy and vertical integration; 
3. The efficacy of decentralized allocation of resources and ex-post evaluation and 
control has increased relative to centralized allocation and ex-ante control, which has 
had the effect of decreasing the payoff to scale; and 
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4. The efficacy of process-oriented structures has increased relative to functional 
structures, which has had the effect of decreasing the payoff to scope. 
 
These shifts are hardly surprising. As Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) 
demonstrated, the comparative advantage of any institutional arrangement boils down 
to a question of information or transaction costs. Changes in information costs should 
dramatically alter the relative advantage of alternative governance arrangements and 
institutional designs. 
 
For example, the computer is rapidly eroding economies of scale in administration, 
production, and marketing and, thereby, the comparative advantage of hierarchy and 
bureaucracy. Today, any organization that can afford a computer workstation and 
software can have first-class administrative systems, ranging from purchasing and 
inventory control to human resources management to financial planning and capital 
budgeting to marketing and logistics. Twenty or so years ago these systems were 
available only to large organizations. Moreover, computerized production now permits 
organizations to produce customized and locally delivered services at mass-production 
prices. 
 
As a result of the declining importance of economies of scale, the average size of the 
workplace has been falling throughout the industrialized world for more than twenty 
years. Large companies are "...mimicking their smaller competitors by shrinking their 
head offices, removing layers of bureaucracy and breaking themselves up into 
constellations of profit centers, ...  concentrating on their core businesses and 
contracting everything else out, ... (and) they are putting a computer on every desk and 
giving power to front-line workers" (Economist 1995, 4-6). 
 
As Jones and Thompson explained (Jones and Thompson 1999), market evolution is 
fundamentally a Darwinian process while organizational change is essentially 
Lamarckian. Markets motivate learning; organizations facilitate it. Williamson’s dictum 
that the choice between markets and hierarchies can be resolved to a question of 
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minimizing transactions costs, i.e., minimizing search, bargaining, and enforcement 
costs can, therefore, be reformulated as a question: which is situationally harder, 
motivating people to perform or teaching them to perform?  
 
Bureaucracy is an effective system for perpetuating and even refining existing 
information. It is, however, a slow and cumbersome mechanism for acquiring new 
knowledge. The new organizational forms (e.g., multidisciplinary teams, located close to 
the citizen/customer) rely on information technology to supply read-only memory (i.e., to 
maintain existing information), increasing the focus on the acquisition of new 
knowledge. That is, they are primarily learning organizations. Businesses, for example, 
used to believe that access to capital was their most valuable asset and that the chief 
task of top-management was allocating it to productive uses. Now, most believe that 
knowledge is their most precious resource and that management’s most important job is 
ensuring that knowledge is generated widely and used efficiently. As Jack Welch, 
chairman of General Electric explained, the centralized, bureaucratic procedures it once 
used were "...right for the 1970s, a growing handicap in the 1980s, and would have 
been a ticket to the bone yard in the 1990s" (Welch 1994, 30).  
 
The lessons for developing nations would seem to be that they do not need to repeat 
the experience of developed nations to benefit from better approaches to knowledge 
creation, human resource motivation, productive use of new information technologies, 
devising organizational designs to best advantage, and testing of new types of 
institutional arrangements for production and delivery of services to the public. The 
lessons from both government and the private sector in developed nations indicate that 
new institutional forms and a greater market orientation, along with enhanced devolution 
of fiscal rights and responsibilities to local governments, plus experimentation with 
competition in service delivery should be combined with traditional measures such as 
developing a highly competent civil service system operated according to the rule of law 
and merit principles as the way of the future. According to the arguments advanced 
here, creating the knowledge culture requires a combination of practices, old and new, 
some associated with the design of better governance systems, others taking 
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advantage of competitive market dynamics, and increasing the trend towards fiscal and 
policy devolution where human resource capacity has been created in developing 
nations so as to permit them to manage effectively and less centrally. 
 
Performance management and knowledge creation in Asia 
 
While more examples of performance management and knowledge creation in the 
public sector may be found in the developed world, it is clear that advances in these 
areas also are underway in Asia.  As explained in this paper, there are a number of 
ways to approach strengthening performance management in public sector. China is a 
prime example of a developing nation that is experimenting with market solutions to 
public service supply within a system that evidences a high degree of fiscal and policy 
devolution. This pathway is pursued under the authority of a highly centralized national 
political and governance framework, but one that permits a high degree of provincial 
and local economic experimentation and innovation. Performance is enhanced through 
a combination of hierarchy, given the nation’s well-developed civil service system, and 
performance rewards associated with non-bureaucratic approaches, e.g., individual 
leadership and managerial rewards in terms of career enhancement opportunity for 
successful teamwork and organizational goal achievement. 
 
In the Philippines, a major initiative has been undertaken to develop results-based 
budgets. A proposal to adopt this approach is underway and is to be submitted to 
Congress in 2005. In addition, ADB and the World Bank recently issued a report on 
decentralization in the Philippines that states, “Measuring and managing LGU [local 
government unit] performance assume special importance in the context of the issues 
examined in this report" (ADB and World Bank 2005, 43).  The report notes that 
performance management has advanced at two levels in the Philippines, national 
government and partner organizations have shown “…interest in nationally standardized 
tools that could be used to assess LGU performance and provide incentives to high 
performing units and capacity building to others. The result is that a wide array of such 
tools are in use…” Some measures apply to measurement of cash management of 
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revenues and expenditures while others are applied to evaluate LGU performance on 
specific normative criteria and also permit comparison between local governments. 
Some of the measures are directed at rule compliance while others measure 
“development outcomes.” The report also notes that some of the performance tools are 
used by the LGUs themselves, “...to measure costs and ongoing performance" (ADB 
and World Bank 2005) At the same time, a highly visible initiative has continued to be 
used by the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) in the form of a 
Local Productivity and Performance Measurement System (LPPMS).  LPPMS was 
initiated in the 1980s for monitoring of LGU service delivery and with the legal 
enactment of LGUs in 1991 it has proven useful to monitor the substantial devolution of 
powers and functions authorized in law. More recently, the LPPMS has been employed 
as more than a central agency monitoring instrument; it is now used as a management 
mechanism by some LGUs to measure and assess their own performance, e.g., in 
planning and budgeting. Other national government departments have developed LGU 
performance monitoring systems. For example, the Bureau of Local Government 
Finance, with assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development, has 
created and maintains an online database of 126 distinct features of LGU finance and 
the idea of linking this data into the LPPMS is under consideration. Other government 
national agencies have databases that might be similarly linked, e.g., the Department of 
Budget and Management, the Commission on Audit, and the Civil Service Commission.  
 
In addition, a Citizen Satisfaction Index System (CSIS) is in place in the Philippines to 
score and evaluate a variety of areas of devolved service delivery responsibility and to 
increase citizen participation and influence in local governance, e.g., agriculture, health, 
social services, the environment and natural resources. In augmentation of these efforts 
an internet based Local Development Watch (DevWatch) system also has been 
deployed to evaluate the level of development in LGUs and to focus on and make more 
visible highest priority needs in underserved local governments.  
 
One evident question about the orientation of these monitoring systems is: for what 
purposes are they used?  Monitoring often leads to control, which in the case of the 
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Philippines, given the degree of devolution established in the law in 1991, could result in 
excessive influence of central agencies over LGUs. On the other hand, good monitoring 
systems can be used to steer resources to highest areas of need both in terms of 
location and sector. 
 
In selected other nations, as reported by ADB in 2004, different elements of results-
based management (RBM) have been put into practice to enhance performance. The 
ADB report states, “RBM involves ensuring the desired outputs and outcomes are 
defined as results, that resources are adequate and timely to deliver these results, that 
the organization has clear accountability and authority for performance and that 
processes in place support the conversion of resources into results" (ADB 2004).  
 
As part of its Reform Agenda in mid-2003 ADB adopted management for development 
results (MfDR) as a management approach to focus on outcomes that matter to 
developing member nations (DMCs).  MfDR is intended to increase “…attention to the 
value generated from resources invested and to incorporate lessons from ongoing 
operations to improve the design and implementation of development interventions” 
(ADB 2004b). ADB is attempting to mainstream MfDR in support of poverty reduction in 
Asia. The long term goal is to strengthen DMC capacity to implement results-oriented 
poverty reduction initiatives on a sustainable basis. Examples of recent adoption of the 
approach in South Asia are found in introduction of results based (RB) Country Strategy 
and Programs (CSPs) in Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. In addition, there are two ADB 
sponsored technical assistance projects under development with the National Planning 
Commission in Nepal, one assistance program in Maldives to assist with the 
development of a results oriented 7th National Development Plan, and in Pakistan 
ADB’s resident mission is working closely with the government to develop an IT based 
project performance monitoring system now under pilot testing. The South-Asia 




A number of other initiatives are in progress in South Asia to strengthen public sector 
performance including development of National Poverty Reduction Strategies, adoption 
of Medium term Expenditure Frameworks, improving intergovernmental fiscal relations 
including fiscal decentralization and devolution (Wescott 2005), poverty monitoring, civil 
service reforms, anticorruption initiatives, use of improved information technology in 
financial management, accounting and other areas, and use of public scorecards on 
performance (ADB 2005a). 
 
Additional examples of adoption of performance and results oriented management in 
Asia are initiatives in progress, in Mongolia and Cambodia. The following initiatives are 
reported in the education sector in these nations (ADB 2004b). 
 
1. Mongolia uses performance agreements to set out what education results are to 
be achieved by political and administrative units at central, provincial and local 
government level. 
2. Mongolia has proposed a set of new measures for measuring performance and 
results in education. 
3. Cambodia has set national targets for school performance and teacher 
assessment and Mongolia provides for individual school target setting. 
4. Gender target setting and planning to achieve a more equitable gender balance 
is a targeted result in both Cambodia and Mongolia. In Cambodia, girls are 
underrepresented and in Mongolia boys are under represented. Cambodia has 
instituted a program to raise gender performance targets. 
5. Raising student enrollment rates is targeted in Cambodia but barriers include 
discretionary fees by schools that poor families cannot afford. Cambodia has 
tackled this problem with an innovative program. To avoid the delays and barriers 
of the usual budget funding practices, they came up with a series of program 
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budgets that moved funds directly to schools and made schools accountable for 
this funding.  
6. Mongolia is concerned about monitoring quality of education outputs and 
outcomes and seeks solutions to enable such initiatives. In Mongolia there also is 
concern over getting greater results from kindergartens – especially achieving 
greater coverage achieving greater coverage and more equitable access. Some 
performance measures and possible solutions have been suggested.  
7. Provincial demand forecasting is used in Cambodia by provincial education 
leaders in attempt to sustain adequate service supply over the medium term. 
Forecasting demand and supply is used to gain sufficient time to initiate remedial 
action in building or acquiring facilities and training and redeploying teachers. 
The Cambodian case study demonstrates how forecasting reveals trends that 
promote timely decisions to avoid future crisis. 
8. Ministry-Donor partnership. In many countries efforts to improve education take 
place with little coordination between donors and the Ministry under pressure to 
implement initiatives advocated by each donor. A case study of Cambodia shows 
that these problems are avoided to ensure that results and resources are 
aligned. 
9. Ministry of Finance and Education cooperation. Achieving results is the job of the 
Education ministry but control over resources rests with Ministries of Finance. 
Often there is a lack of cooperation and understanding between these two 
ministries with the result that education initiatives are frustrated. Cambodia has 
recognized the results-based management benefits in close cooperation between 
Finance and Education Ministries. Cambodia has improved communication by 
establishing a joint committee to promote understanding and cooperation. 
10. RBM relies upon clear statements and chains of accountability. Job holders must 
know what is to be achieved, how they will be measured and to whom they are 
accountable. In Mongolia, performance agreements have been developed 
 23 
between political appointees, Minister to Governors, and also between the 
Minister and the department and provincial and district units.  
11. Education involves many people at all levels from schools to central ministry. 
With so many involved, it is important that there are effective means of building 
an RBM culture that includes developing and communicating plans and targets 
and reviewing past results. Cambodia does this through convening an annual 
education congress. 
12. A major challenge for education officials is how to measure education quality and 
ensure that provincial educational units have the capacity to advise upon and 
assess quality performance.  Mongolia is developing its capacity to evaluate 
education delivery quality. 
13. Mongolia is attempting to improve effective communications using IT networking. 
With education delivered through many schools, districts and provinces, good 
communication systems are vital. IT systems allow information, plans, 
performance and knowledge to be shared. Barriers to good communications 
include lack of electricity, few computers, and absence of computer 
communication skills.  
14. Education in Cambodia has adopted internal auditing to build confidence in the 
Government and among donors in educational governance, to demonstrate the 
appropriateness in use of funds and the reliability of its reported performance 
data. 
15. Cambodia provides means for resolving disputes in the complex task of 
delivering education. Key issues pursued include how communities can make 
their grievances on education results, resources and processes known so as to 
have them resolved. 
16. In Mongolia, a “good practice” school performance agreement sets out expected 
results to indicate how school performance should be judged and who can be 
held accountable for what.  
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ADB also provides all its member nations with process and procedural guidelines and a 
framework for developing results based country strategies and programs that indicate 
how to achieve alignment of country and development goals, how to approach 
specification of how to define outcomes and outcome indicators, how to effectively 
mobilize country teams, the method for conducting performance of country assessment 
program evaluations, implementation and results monitoring instructions and sector 
roadmaps for use of RBM (ADB 2005c). It should be noted that OECD, UNDP. 
CIDADFID, IADB, UNFPA, USAID, and the World Bank provide documents to assist 





A number of methods are proposed from a variety of sources on how to strengthen 
performance in public sector management. Definition and measurement of resource 
inputs, workload, outputs and outcomes within a results based framework is widely 
advocated by a number of sources including some of the best known scholars and most 
prestigious organizations in the world. Managing for results in various forms continues 
to be applied in a number of developed nations including the United Kingdom, the USA, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland and in other western European nations. 
The keys to this approach from our perspective are development of accurate databases 
and measurement methodologies, and application of performance measurement in 
decision making, e.g., for strategic planning, budgeting, human resource management 
and investment, infrastructure development, acquisition and procurement, and in 
sectoral planning and resourcing, e.g., health, education, social services, environmental 
protection and others. 
 
Critical to the success of these initiatives in our view is creation of knowledge cultures in 
public sector and non-governmental organizations. Because improvement in 
performance is always linked to learning and human capacity development, the 
knowledge culture is an essential ingredient for success in strengthening performance 
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in both developed and developing nations. A purely methodological approach of 
defining and measuring outputs and outcomes and relating results to costs is not 
sufficient in itself to forge lasting progress in enhancing public sector performance. In 
fact, where a purely methodological approach is taken, very quickly many if not most  
participants in the effort will become consumed by the details of measurement and 
verification to the detriment of actual improvement of management results and socio-
economic outcomes. Critical to the implementation of performance measurement 
methods is that measures and results must be useful for deciding about future courses 
of action when alternatives are present to policy and resource decision makers. In other 
words, to succeed performance measurement and results based analysis must be 
translated effectively into performance management (Argyris 1993). All performance 
measurement approaches should be continually assessed against the criterion of cost 
versus value of information for decision.  
 
Further, as suggested by Ingraham et. al. performance management must include 
investment in human capital building at all levels of organizations, i.e., leadership, staff 
and line managers and into the field (Ingraham, Selden and Moynihan 2000, 60). This is 
particularly the case for developing nations where capacity deficits present real barriers 
to implementation of performance and results based management initiatives. For this 
reason the value of working to create a knowledge culture that encourages self-
assessment and learning, management innovation, and increased investment in human 
resources and information technology is probably higher in developing countries than in 
developed nations. 
 
Finally, the relationships between strengthening performance in the public sector and 
ability and willingness of leaders, mangers and organizations to adapt to new economic 
circumstance with alternative organizational and governance arrangements must be 
stressed. The international economic order is undergoing a massive transformation.  Its 
technology, its problems, and -- to a considerable extent -- its economics are radically 
different from those that traditional, highly-structured and rule-bound Weberian type 
bureaucratic organizations were created to cope with in seeking to advance production 
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and problem solving.  In today’s world, many old problems bureaucracies were 
designed to deal with well have been wiped away. However, new problems are awaiting 
new technologies and the formulation of new governing instruments that are more 
adaptable and better able to network to solve the problems they confront, e.g., poverty 
reduction, prevention of wars, economic planning and development, environmental 
protection and species preservation, response to natural disasters and threats from the 
spread of new, highly virulent diseases. The painful lessons of failure of contemporary 
unilateral action by bureaucratic organizations to crises of all sorts are plentiful.  
 
We are by no means the first to recognize the changes that are taking place in the world 
economy, markets and threat environment and the potential lessons from experience 
about how to improve performance responsiveness in conduct of the public’s business.  
Nor are we the first to suggest that performance management represents a wholesale 
change in the tactics and responsibilities of government.  Schwartz, for example, 
observed, “...a profound shift toward a new kind of regime .... not simply a shift towards 
less state, but also a shift to a different kind of state" (Schwartz 1994).  He attributed 
this shift not to conservative politics but to international market pressures.  He stressed 
that many of the governments that have embraced performance and results oriented 
management are or were dominated by social democrats.  We would emphasize that 
increased market pressure is largely a consequence of reduced transaction and 
transportation costs, both manifestations of the computer and the information revolution 
-- the same forces that have driven change in the private sector since the 1970s. 
 
We conclude that there can be no single theory or set of managerial prescriptions to 
guide the strengthening of performance in the public sector, whether positive or 
normative, that is sufficient for all times or circumstances.  Any institutional arrangement 
has the potential to improve upon another. Conclusions about the utility of new 
organizational and institutional governance arrangements depend essentially upon a 
comparison of information costs under each of the alternatives.  The information 
revolution has dramatically transformed information costs and, thereby, the relative 
efficacy of various institutional arrangements to deal with crises, threats and changes in 
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markets.  Many of the consequences of these changes can be lumped together under 
the rubric of performance and results based management.  Inevitably, these changes 
will refashion the institutions of government and public management and, perhaps, even 
the nature of the state itself. 
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